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Interview with Mr. Harry Labouisse
By Baquer Namazi and Jack Charnow

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
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Namazi: I'd like to start on the question of UNICEF's involvement in emergencies that, including yourself, some of the major disasters and emergencies that came up in different parts of the world. At all times UNICEF was involved in assisting children and women in difficult situations and there seems to have been some pressure that on one side we do not attend the needs and on the other side we trend for UNICEF to be more concerned with long term measures. How do you see these modern trends and what is your experiences of these decisions?

Labouisse: I may not be very helpful in saying how I see evolving trends because I'm not really up on recent developments within the UN system. However, based on experience I have felt and continue to feel that UNICEF has a very important role to play in the case of emergencies. I think this for two reasons. One, UNICEF started off its life as an emergency agency geared to dealing with emergencies and it still has that structure—the machinery exists and I think it's a very good machinery. Experience has shown



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that UNICEF can deliver some needed supplies in the cases of emergencies more rapidly than others. The second reason, which I think is very important is that UNICEF's focus on children makes it particularly important to have UNICEF involved. Other organizations also help children but there's a general focus on providing general supplies. I am thinking of one emergency where stock fish was supplied which children could not eat. UNICEF has concentrated on the kind of supplies that are needed by children, in particular the ill ones. So even though WHO and World Food Programme and the HCR are involved, I think that UNICEF should continue to play its role, I think it's a very important role.

Namazi: To pursue this matter a little more, the two type of disasters are now popularly described as man-made and national disasters. National disasters, humanitarian help is there and governments have no problem in seeking assistance. Man-made disasters, the situation seems to be a little more delicate and at times governments are not very prone to raise the issue. What has been your experience in such situations where the disasters, they happen but governments are not very strong in coming forward?

Labouisse: I think it varies according to each individual case. As a general rule however, I would suggest that UNICEF in providing assistance in emergencies should concentrate on the delivery of the assistance and doing it relatively quietly without too much fanfare. This raises very serious problems. I'll give you an

example. I was in the state of Assam in India, I think it was January 1975, I went with John Grun up to Assam and there had been terrible floods and people had been moved out of the way of danger, I went back to New Delhi a little later on to talk to Mrs. Gandhi who was then the Prime Minister. We were talking about the situation in Assam and the need for help. They wanted help and they wanted to raise some money. I alluded to a situation that had taken place several years ago before during a great drought in the state of Bihar and I had seen Mrs. Gandhi at that time and she asked me to go to Bihar and see what the situation was. I did go and saw officials who told me that there was plenty of food in India. The problem was getting the government to move it from places where it was stored to places where it was badly needed. Nevertheless there was no question about the need to stop the terrible starvation, so we in UNICEF tried to raise funds for this and had some of our committees do so. The UNICEF committee in Ireland tried to raise funds for this emergency and the Ambassador of India in Ireland complained to the government of Ireland about UNICEF making the statements about the horrors about the situation in India.

Now back to 1975, Mrs. Gandhi and I recalled that incident and the difficulty of finding funds, if we couldn't talk about the situation. She said she didn't mind our talking about it but the trouble with most relief organizations was that they talked about

it in a way as if they had discovered the problem—as if they were the only ones who knew about it and the government didn't know. As a matter of fact, the government of India knew about the problems in Bihar and elsewhere in India, and were probably doing a great deal more than any outside agency can do. In other words, she finally said it's a question of degree and of measurement. If we want to help and if they want our help, we should do it in a moderate way as far as publicity is concerned. So I think that one of the very important things is to try to do your best under the circumstances and not take issue or make a statement which can embarrass a government.

Let me just add, I don't mind embarrassing a government, but the problem is does the embarrassing of the government prevent you from doing the primary job you want to do which is to aid children? These are always difficult situations.

I remember another example in 1971 in what was then East Pakistan which later became Bangladesh. We had been carrying on a programme there for some time and I had gone down to the Chittagong—the port where some supplies were coming in and I went up on the hills beyond the Chittagong and the people of this little village let me in a little room and told me that they were very afraid for themselves and for what was going to happen in the village. The story they told me was that some Pakistan

military people had come into this village and objected to the fact that some violence had taken place. I think that someone had blown up some big electric pylons, in the area soldiers came in. They said that unless the village disclosed who did this and turned them over that on the following Saturday sometime in the morning, all the men age 15 and over should be concentrated in one place. The people in the village assumed that this meant that the men were going to be shot and women raped. I said that this wasn't really something within the competence of UNICEF but that I would bring this to the attention of the proper authorities. I did go back to Dacca and talked the then Pakistan governor and told him the story and he assured me that this thing would be looked into; there would be no such gathering of the, all the men in one place. Now, I didn't make any publicity about this. Later on another trip to Bangladesh I met some of the people from that village who had come to Dacca to see me to thank me, because this thing hadn't taken place. If the governor had not been receptive to what I was saying, or if I felt there was some sort of hostility then I would have been prepared to make a public statement. But it was much easier to do this way through quiet tones channels than to antagonize people and I found this is true generally speaking.

It happened in, also Nigeria. We never, in UNICEF, made a great deal of publicity about the deaths of the children in Nigeria, back in 1968. There were dying children on both sides, the Biafra side and the Nigeria side. We had not played a very open and active role in the thing. I went and talked to General Gowon who was the head of the military government and told him we want to help on both sides, on the Biafra side and the Federal government side. He said he couldn't agree, this is Civil War and we couldn't help. I suggested to him that we were concerned with children no matter where they were. Finally he said that well he couldn't agree but all he would say was he wouldn't shoot the planes down that the food was going in—mostly from Sao Tome and the islands off shore being flown into Biafra. Now, at the same time General Gowon said that there was only one agency that he considered really trustworthy. He was very upset about some of the churches who were taking sides, but he said the Quakers were the one organization that he had confidence in. That they tried to help on both sides and tried to negotiate things and didn't try and didn't want any publicity for themselves. And I felt that that's terribly important in these situations. I remember also in Nigeria, the Switzerland Ambassador to Nigeria in those days, 1968, Fritz Reál was the person who really brought the horrors of the situation to the attention of the world. Before UNICEF went in, in 1968, I had talked to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and I suggested that they

were the much better fitted to deal with the overall situation than we were or anyone else were because they did deal with war situations. But I said I thought it was very important that they put the proper person in there so they did get a man in who was then their their Ambassador in Moscow name Gus Lindt and they sent him down to Nigeria as an ICRC representative. Later on Reál told me that Lindt antagonized the government terribly because he wanted to be treated as the Head of State. He wanted to be given fancy treatment and finally when he wasn't, one day as he was going back to Europe he left in a huff. He went from Sao Tome to Lagos and wouldn't see the government. This is not the attitude. I think you have to go very quietly on these things and try to do what you can do and you have to measure the problem of publicity against its counter effect. To have some publicity is necessary because you have to raise some money. But you've got to do it in a sensible way and balanced way.

Namazi: Have you every been confronted with a situation where the problem has existed and apparently information has leaked out of a disaster situation in certain parts of the country, but for various political reasons, government concern refuses to acknowledge it.

Labouisse: This happened, I believe in Ethiopia, back about 1973 I think it was. Haile Selassie was the Emperor and just before the present government came. This was one of the things that led to the revolution. There was a terrible drought and a lot of hunger and starvation and the government did not want to make any publicity about it. We had a young fellow named Steven Green out there who did make a public statement about it. I was a little upset about that because I didn't know what the effect was going to be, whether this was going to prevent our doing our work, otherwise antagonize the government and have them throw us out or not. But, these are the questions that have to be balanced because each situation is different and not to mention, I mentioned about Chittagong Hills, this is one in which I would have no question about making public if they wouldn't act on it even if they might have been antagonized.

Namazi: Have you ever been in a situation where governments are reluctant to acknowledge emergency situations, especially if it's a man-made disaster type. Do you feel that through diplomacy one can persuade the government to allow some humanitarian assistance to take place.

Labouisse: There is a case that isn't exactly on the point but to a certain extent it is and that was Kampuchea in 1979, when the Pol Pot government was thrown out and the Heng Sandrin government came to

power in Binh Dinh supported by the Vietnamese. We in UNICEF wanted to help. We knew there was terrible suffering. There had been ever since the Pol Pot government came in in 1975 and UNICEF and every other agency were thrown out of Cambodia. So this was the first time we had a chance to get back in, and during those four years, there had been thousands, million's of deaths. We arranged to have one representative of UNICEF go with one representative from ICRC and we started this operation. It was very gradual, I think they were at first, the Heng Sandrin people were rather very suspicious of any outsiders, but over a long period of months we did manage to set up a programme of assistance. But the government wanted me to agree that UNICEF would give assistance only through government in Phnom Penh and we would not deal directly to helping people along the borders. Oxfam agreed to this and I refused to agree to it. We had a separate operation which we were giving quite a lot of help along the border to the refugees and to people in opposition to the Heng Sandrin government. This was a very sore point throughout our time there and I don't think that the government ever accepted the fact what we were doing. They kept after us and wanted us to do things through them but I did say to the government in Phnom Penh that we would not do it through them. We would not give them the exclusive right to handle our supplies. I also talked to the government in Hanoi and told them we were going to help on both sides and they said they

understood. This is not a situation in which we were contending with the government about how they handle aid. We were just not going to agree that the government had exclusive right to use our aid.

I think that there are a number of cases under war conditions, civil war, that governments don't want you to help the other side. I think it's perfectly natural, but from the point of view from UNICEF I think we had to assert the right to help from both sides.

We did it in Vietnam, we've had a programme of assistance to Vietnam long before the split north and south. And there came a period of time when we in UNICEF felt that since we were helping children in the southern part of Vietnam, we also should be there helping the northern part. Some governments, including my own government didn't agree with this—they didn't think we should have assisted because of the war in Vietnam. We did it nevertheless. We finally got the Board to approve because in the first instance we managed to get some money from the Dutch government and also from the Swiss government which they said was to be used for the north. In other words, it wasn't using any money of people who objected to it. But there were objections from the south, there were objections from several governments to our doing this, but we did it anyhow.

Charnow: I think the possibility that UNICEF has of noted projects as special contributions gives us flexibility for that sort of thing so we can go ahead much better than other agencies. Namazi referred earlier to differences of view about how much goes in for long range aid and how much goes in for emergency aid. That is partly eased, I believe by the fact that we can get special contributions.

Labouisse: I think this is very true, Jack. Also when UNICEF provides the aid for the emergency—just keeping someone alive, giving some food for children—I feel that from the very beginning we ought to be thinking in terms of the long-term. In other words, you're thinking in terms of immediate needs, but that ought to be tied in to some sort of recuperation and development project in the long run to prevent it from happening again. And I think most of the programmes have done that and as you say, it's easier to get funds from special contributions. We get a lot of money for Nigeria, a lot of money for other countries in Libya, Cambodia, and Kampuchea by appealing for special funds.

Namazi: Usually, the policies that you have to have government approval, even if it's tacit to get into the country. But in the Kampuchean situation, you had the government in a place which was not recognized by the UN, but it seems that UNICEF's mandate is so flexible that despite this constrain it was able to operate.

What are the special privileges of UNICEF's mandate that allows it to operate in such situations and other agencies cannot?

Labouisse: I don't recall the precise words of the UN resolutions which established UNICEF, but in effect, it said it's there to help children. And if there is one provision, as I recall about governments, it doesn't say you have to have the consent of the government, but there's some kind of provision about government. I've always read it in terms of it wasn't an agreement unless the government objected, you could do it. And we did this in a number of cases. We did it in Nigeria. One of the big cases in the country Africa and there was an example—the World Food Programme had a lot of food and it had, as I mentioned before, stockfish and they were prepared to send it to Nigeria. And I suggested that if they send it, they send it through UNICEF because we were working on both sides. At first they started to do it and then the government itself said no. The government in Lagos said no to them and I tried to get the World Food Programme to give it to UNICEF and they wouldn't do that because they felt they had to deal only with governments and with members of the United Nations or one of the members of the specialized agencies. And I never thought that that was important. I thought that children transcended all of this so you try to deal with children as best you can.

Namazi: So the issue of addressing children itself really knocks down a lot of road blocks to assistance. Now pursue this a little further and I think this is a very fascinating aspect of UNICEF's work - working on both sides. But usually, the assumption is that there is one voice of authority to speak to each side, but nowadays with the way conflicts are taken up sometimes it becomes very localized and there are many groups involved in conflict with governments. I think Lebanon is a case and point. When you have many, many factors to deal with the situation becomes more complicated. How would you think that in a situation like Lebanon, I think that even under these circumstances in UNICEF was also involved, but how did you deal with this when more than one fraction of this?

Labouisse: In Lebanon during the mid-70's and late 70's before things went completely to pieces the way they have now. UNICEF played, I think, a key role in Lebanon. We had Gullmar Andersson a Swedish staff member in there. He used to be a police man in Stockholm and we had him once in Ethiopia and when they finally got him to go to Lebanon, he was absolutely wonderful. He was the only person really who could cross through both sides, through all factions. It got to the point when the United States government couldn't spend its money and wanted to help in Lebanon. I remember at one point, they gave \$6 million for some water supplies. UNICEF was the only organization who could do it

because Andersson moved back and forth and he could get materials through the lines. Part of this is, I think, is UNICEF's mandate and its accepted reputation as a nonpolitical agency trying to do a humanitarian job for people. Part of it is the quality of the individuals in UNICEF and in this case I think it's very much the individual. At one time I had quite a disagreement with the US and the British governments and several others when they decided they wanted to set up a centralized point for dealing with all emergencies and so they created UNDRQ, United Nations Disaster Relief Organization in Geneva. This was pushed very much by the Americans. I remember in Geneva one of the ECOSOC meetings when this came up, I opposed this and I had talks with the Americans and British telling them why I thought this was wrong. First of all, there were agencies in existence who were able to do things. UNDRO wouldn't be able to do things. It was just going to be an agency which might try to coordinate. Coordination is an important thing in relief operations because there are a lot of people in the game and some of them get in each other's way. But I didn't feel that you could have one agency set up which had no practical experience and was not going to be able to add anything to the totality of the relief agencies. I was overruled, and since it was established, we did lend one of our key people to help them get started. But I don't think it ever proved itself. I think this is one of the reasons you see today in Africa in this famine that UNDRO not involved at all.

I think that it's a useful thing to create or establish a lead agency, we've done this in the UN before. We did this in Kampuchea, UNICEF was named by the Secretary-General as the lead agency. Now this doesn't necessarily please other agencies. They don't like to have one agency singled out. They don't want to be told what to do. UNICEF itself is sometimes jealous of our own prerogatives. But with men and women of good will you can co-ordinate things amongst yourselves. There may have been problems in some cases but in effect, what we're trying to do is to find ways to help people and one of the ways to help people is to use the agencies which have available the resources to do it, manpower, and experience so forth. I just think that we should make use of those services and not dampen the enthusiasm which can happen if you are going to work for someone else.

Charnow:

On the situation of the lead agency, are there situations in which there is a delicate political interest, perhaps not among the agencies with which we work, but in the Secretary General's office?

Labouisse:

Let me go back again to the situation in Nigeria. In the summer of 1968 when the whole question was very much in the public mind, we had a meeting in Geneva with the Secretary General who was then U. Thant, the head of the World Food Programme and the FAO, World Health Organization, and UNICEF, about what should be done

and I had told them that I had talked with the ICRC and they had agreed they were going to send a head man down. I think everyone was made aware the importance of doing something about this terrible situation. On his way back by plane to New York from Geneva, the Secretary General sent me a telegram which transmitted a copy of a message he was then sending to General Gowan, the head of the federal government in Lagos saying that the Secretary General would like to send a representative to Nigeria to see what the UN family could do in the situation, and he added in his message to me that he would like me to go as his representative. I sent him a message that I preferred not to go as his representative for two reasons. Number one I was going the next day for UNICEF, but secondly, to answer the question you just raised, if I went as the Secretary General's representative, there would be bound to have some kind of political connotation since he would have to represent the UN. He would have to recognize the fact that the membership of the UN requires certain things. He can't disregard it. Eventually the Secretary-General did send a representative, about two weeks after arrived; and that was a long delay even at that. When he got there, he didn't do much except report. He reported how many were dying and that was it. This didn't please anybody and as I mentioned before, the World Food Programme didn't help later on because, again it had to deal with government members of the UN. So I think there's a limitation on how far you can operate if you are operating for the Secretary-General.

In Kampuchea, I never wanted to represent the UN. Also I never wanted to have Jackson or anyone else telling UNICEF what to do because he would also be representing the UN, restricted or constrain because of the UN rules. We weren't. I think that we can be made a lead agency without being constrained by the politics of the UN.

I think one of UNICEF's greatest strengths is its nonpolitical stance, it's integrity which I think countries have accepted. They don't think we're trying to play politics or get involved in politics. UNICEF has a clean record. I think it is a very valuable thing not to get mixed up in politics.

Charnow: In situations where there was conflict on both sides, was possible to use representatives of governments on the Board who had a close association to one side or another as a sort of emissary for us to prepare the way, to explain what we could do. And do you see that as a possible method of getting at a sticky situation?

Labouisse: Yes, we had such a situation and I can see it being used again. We used it in Vietnam around 1972-1973 when the question came up about helping in the North. I was accused of not knowing anything about it, not having a view on it. And there was some question on whether or not North Vietnam wanted to give any

recognition to the UN. We had on our Board of UNICEF at that time the Polish representative, Dr. Kozusznick, who I regarded as a very decent human being. I think he had from time to time to say things in Board meetings which had a political aspect, but generally speaking, I thought, he was non political. So we agreed with him that he would go to Hanoi and make a personal report to the Executive Director. He did go and talk to the people in Hanoi and they agreed to have UNICEF's assistance. He filed a report with me which did have a certain amount of political coloration in it. But I don't think he wrote that part himself. I think it was a result of the kind of games people play. The report did try to cast some blame on the United States for dropping bombs, etc. which was true but it had nothing to do with UNICEF. That made it a little difficult. But it did open a way for us to send two representatives to Hanoi and we started our programme from that. I think this can happen again. It's a very delicate situation because a lot of people who are not sufficiently objective could get into an awful lot of trouble. We've skated on thin ice in that situation, but it turned out alright.

Charnow: Did you do much in the way of personal consultations with some of the governments, not necessarily Board representatives but other people, perhaps more of the decision makers in the government who would have influence on one side or the other?

Labouisse: Sometimes yes, not, in this particular Indochina situation but later on in 1979, one of the people I talked to was the Prime Minister of Thailand to try to get a feeling of what we could do, what was the possibilities were of helping from Bangkok, and the problem of being in an area in which there were citizens of his own country probably suffering to a certain extent, while these refugees were on the border getting supplies from the outside world and some of his people not getting the supplies. Also there was the question of diversion of supplies. I was concerned with reports that supplies were being divert. The Prime Minister's general idea was that it was important to do something despite the diversion of specific materials. Also at that time, I did talk to the people in Hanoi, the Prime Minister and Foreign minister about Kampuchea, trying to encourage them to primarily to try to get them to help move some supplies. There were a lot of supplies coming into Phnom Penh and not being delivered and we thought that if we could get small planes to fly where the roads were impassable, it would be helpful. So I tried to encourage them to do that. It didn't work, but there were situations in which you tried to get assistance from the other government.

Namazi: Another interesting area where UNICEF became active when you were head of UNICEF was giving assistance children and mothers associated with liberation movements and refugees from colonial countries. I think it must have been quite difficult reaching

the target group of children in these areas. Now how did you overcome this problem and what are your confessions of this experience?

-Labouisse: Well since the liberation movement, we have given some assistance to some of the Palestinian groups. The PLO for example. This is a very probably the most sensitive and delicate of all situations of the world because of the political sensitivities and the problems of the Middle East, but we've given some assistance there. In Africa we were helping out some of the people in Zambia who were refugees from Rhodesia that time.

The situation along the border of Thailand and Cambodia was similar situation. There was no government recognized by the United Nations in Phnom Penh and the UN recognized the old Pol Pot government, and these people along the border were, you might say, a liberation movement themselves trying to deliberate from the Heng Sendrin government.

Again, I think that as long as we can keep out of politics and just focus entirely on the well being of children and how to help them, I think you try to do. But if people try to prevent it, we can't shoot our way into any place, obviously. But we could try to use every possible way of persisting in situations in which we know our assistance is needed.

Charnow: I think Baquer knows more about this than I do, but there seems to be a much more active trend since IYC and as a result of events in the world generally for people to say, "Well UNICEF is a spokesman for children; UNICEF has an obligation to speak up; If UNICEF doesn't speak up, who will?"

Namazi: I think Jack is referring to instances where there are gross violations of human rights issues leading with women and children and there's very little that is being done at world level to deal with.

Labouisse: Well, I think we have to consider very carefully what that means. You have a question of who casts the first stone I remember when Peter Adamson who writes the State of the World Children for Jim Grant did his first draft for me. First of all I had some doubt that we knew about the state of the all the world's children to write about it, particularly since our emphasis had been on children in developing countries. But, he drafted something which I think is quite good and amongst other things, he spoke of the suicide rate in Sweden among children, child abuse in West Germany and United States and a whole lot of things from the statistics he'd gotten. But he didn't have anything in there about what went on beyond the Iron Curtain. I said why don't we say something about that, but then we don't know anything about it. I said it was wrong for us to come out

as an official agency of the United Nations and say that Swedens and Germans and Americans and a series of other countries in addition to developing countries are misbehaving and not doing what they should do in respect to the human rights and then we not saying anything about everyone else. I'm not sure how much good it does in the long run. It may be speaking out against by UNICEF criticizing Western and the Soviet Union would do some good. But I don't think it would do any good myself; there's enough said in the papers anyhow and people know about it. I just have a feeling that UNICEF's main job is not to be the world conscience. I don't think that's why we were created, what has given us an assignment. UNICEF has been a good and a very effective agency because it was a practical agency and if we start getting into ideologies and theories then I think you're going to lose a lot of the importance UNICEF can have.

Mamazi: There are other agencies that are created specifically for these tasks, like International Human Rights . . .

Labouisse: Well, the United Nations itself, I mean has been discussing Human Rights Division and all this sort of business. There are a lot of human rights in the world that just don't all effect children. There is a thing called the Rights of a Child. I think that the UN is in a better place to police that than UNICEF would be because as I say, not that I think we should shut our

eyes to the terrible situations which exist in many countries, but I just think that there is just a limit to what you can do if you to be effective. I think if we get involved in trying to police a whole series of things, it's a question of how much time you're going to spend on it, whether it's worthwhile, whether it's going to be effective. It's certainly going to deprive you of doing the things which UNICEF does the best.

Charnow: Would there be possibly another position without becoming preoccupied with it to the extent of cutting substantially into on our major function? Could we, not support efforts by the others through some sort of a modest financial support for certain meetings, research, networks, that sort of thing and also provide moral support?

Namazi: To us, rather than them, you're not really thinking so much of the political dimensions as the humanitarian aspect, specifically one things of the child rights conventions which are drafted with an agreement of all the countries, especially the Russians and the Americans also supporting it. So at what stage some focal point must be geared to monitor of these rights. I think this is what Jack is getting at. UNICEF, how would you feel about UNICEF contributing to the creation of a machinery, not necessary UNICEF itself, to monitor application of these rights.

Labouisse: I personally would not think it was a wise thing for UNICEF to do. If there is going to be, an effort to build fires under the United Nations, the Human Rights Division of the United Nations should to do it rather than UNICEF. If we're going to try to get into that sort of business, we're going to have to have quite a different kind of staff. We're going to have to have a staff that goes around the world and knows what they're talking about in this field which is a very different thing from what we have now. We know something about the problems of children in the developing countries because we have offices there, but in the whole expanse of Latin America and Europe and this country, it would be a very new thing for UNICEF to have to establish that kind of staff. To repeat, I think this would take away from UNICEF's normal functions. I would see no problem about giving some support to cooperating with other agencies with the UN, but I don't think that UNICEF should assume that total responsibility.

Namazi: May I ask one final question? There are times when there are issues come up that UNICEF has to look into which by nature is sensitive and controversial. A good instance, case and point is the paper that the Board is asking UNICEF to prepare in children in difficult situations, including children in situations of armed countries. Now I think you have experienced of taking situations to the Board, how would you suggest that this problem we tackle so that you discussed key matters, but with the least resistance and yet the least sensitivities?

Labouisse: You mean discussed in the forum of the Board?

Charnow: Rather before we get to the Board. The strategy of getting Board agreement.

Labouisse: Well, I think that it is extremely important to do a lot of spade work before you get to the Board. We've had a number of situations in which we did that in the past. Sometimes you have a good Board Chairman who is a very understanding and sensitive fellow who can do a great help and we had this Thedin, we had this in Narcisso Reyes from the Philippines who realized some of the pitfalls in these things and he would talk to his fellow Board members and we would try to work out something which would kind of bridge some of the gaps and not fall into the crevices. I think that's extremely important.

Coming back a little bit to the world conscience of children and the human rights, I think that UNICEF can do a lot if it does it quietly and not try to make a big issue. Some of you think I'd loved to go to the Board meetings and point the finger at someone, but this doesn't do you any good. I think that if you get the right people on the Board, and get the right Chairman, preferably a Chairman or someone you know, they can be extremely helpful.

Namazi: Would you think it is useful to try to establish a dialogue with those members of the Board that would probably have reservations about the position that you're likely to take, that you feel this will accomplish something?

Labouisse: I think this would depend on the situation. Also the country. I mean there were some situations in which you know is completely useless in talking to someone. As a matter of fact, it may be counterproductive.

Namazi: But in general I want you to tell us something about balancing this trust between further involvement in emergency situations, especially if you look at Africa where we really cannot diagnose long term medical emergencies and then the whole policy of UNICEF is sticking through long term conditions. How would you want to balance this to necessary and as you pointed out several times, many instances, UNICEF does have the capacity and UNICEF doesn't act, especially for solving the needs and support the children all like as if nothing took place. How would you replace this actively balance and both

Labouisse: Balance the emergency with the longer term funds. Again, I think this depends on the situations but I feel that we should be concerned not only with the feeding of the child today, but it's also the education of the family and the development of institutional surroundings which will help in the future.

I think it's very difficult without a specific kind of case to speculate on exactly how it should be done, but there are certainly situations in which immediate and phases into a kind of recovery programme and then that kind of goes into a development programme. This is why we try to gradually talk of UNICEF as concerned with development and not just the initial phases of just feeding people.